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Max Rheinsteint and Mary Ann Glendon*
On June 14, 1976, after eight years of deliberation, controversy
and compromise, the "First Law concerning Marriage and Family
Law Reform," was promulgated in West Germany.' The new legisla-
tion introduces2 a comprehensive revision of the law governing di-
vorce and establishes a new system for regulating its economic ef-
fects. The legislation also provides for certain changes that are in-
tended to emphasize the personal and economic independence of
persons married to each other.
German divorce law has, from the beginning, departed in prac-
tice from the fairly strict provisions of the Civil Code of 1900. If one
party strongly desired a divorce, the cooperation of the other party
was frequently obtained through financial concessions. Presented
with an unopposed complaint based on a fabricated ground for di-
vorce, the court rarely exercised its right or fulfilled its duty to
undertake an independent investigation.3
In 1938 when the German Reich and the Republic of Austria
were united to form the National-Socialist dominated Greater Ger-
man Reich (Grossdeutsches Reich), certain aspects of the law of the
two countries were also unified. The Austrian and German Civil
Code provisions governing marriage formation and divorce were re-
pealed and replaced by a single statute, the Marriage Law of
Greater Germany of July 6, 1938.1 The statute made important
innovations in the law governing divorce, an institution previously
available in Austria for Protestants and Jews, but not for the Catho-
lic majority. The rules dealing with the effects of marriage (the
personal and property relationships of the spouses) were not unified
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at that time, however, and remained unchanged in the respective
civil codes.
After the collapse of the Greater German Reich, the law of
marriage was purged of its National Socialist components-in Aus-
tria by the new Austrian government and in the Allied occupational
zones of Germany by the Allied Control Council Law No. 16, of
February 20, 1946.5 Apart from these modifications and a slight
amendment made in 1961,6 the 1938 Marriage Law remained in
force as a separate statute supplementing the Civil Code in what
was constituted in 1949 as the Federal Republic of Germany. The
project of re-examining the law on the incidents of marriage was be-
gun in West Germany in the Basic Law of 1949 which proclaimed
that "[m]en and women have equal rights. ' 7 This proclamation
was implemented in 1957 by the Equal Rights Law which equalized
in most respects the mutual rights and duties of husbands and
wives and established a new legal regime of marital property, the
"community of increase" (Zugewinngemeinschaft), a modified sys-
tem of community property.'
During the 1960s continuing changes in the social structure,
especially in marriage behavior, intensified the demands for further
legal reform. In 1968, shortly after the long predominance of the
conservative Christian Union Parties (Christian Democratic Union
and Christian Social Union) had given way to a coalition of the
Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party, Gerhard
Jahn, then the Minister of Justice, appointed a commission of ex-
perts to do preparatory work on family law reform. The reports of
the Commission and the government bill based on these reports
provoked lively, and at times acrimonious, public discussion. In the
B undestag (Federal House of Representatives) the progressive ele-
ments represented in the government coalition and the more con-
servative groups represented in the Christian Union parties worked
out a compromise after prolonged debates. But a few points re-
mained controversial, and the settlement reached in the Bundestag
was challenged by the Bundesrat (House of States), where the
Union-dominated state governments had a narrow majority. In the
Ehegesetz of Feb. 20, 1946 [EheG], [Gesetz Nr. 16 des Kontrollrats], Amtsblatt des
Kontrollrats in Deutschland 77, 294.
6 Familienrechts~inderungsgesetz (Amendment of Family Law) of Aug. 11, 1961, [1961]
BGBI 11221 (W. Ger.). See note 31 infra.
GRUNDGESETZ art. 3 (W. Ger.).
Gesetz fiber die Gleichberechtigung von Mann und Frau auf dem Gebiete des bxlrger-
lichen Rechts (Law Concerning the Legal Equality of Men and Women in the Area of Civil
Law) of June 18, 1957 [Gleichberechtigungsgesetz-GleichberG] (Equality Law), [1957]
BGBI 1609, BGBI Im 4 Nr. 400-3.
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compromise that finally emerged, the basic ideas of the government
bill were left intact, but some important modifications were made
in the divorce provisions.
The Christian Union Parties successfully insisted on inserting
a provision that stands as the first section of the reform law, and
that now, as section 1353, paragraph 1, opens the Civil Code Title
on Effects of Marriage in General (Wirkungen der Ehe im
Allgemeinen-Book IV. Family Law-Part I, Civil Marriage). It
proclaims that: "Marriage is concluded for a lifetime." The sent-
ence is meant to be an affirmation of the continued vitality of the
ethical-religious principle that marriage is to last "until death do us
part," but, standing where it does, as a preface to the apparently
liberal provisions on divorce that follow, it seems more the expres-
sion of a wish, a hope, or an aspiration in the face of an uncertain
future. One might be inclined to regard it as an ironic epigraph to
the whole reform.
This article will present a translation and preliminary critique
of the central provisions of the reform act of 1976. Examination of
the changes made by the act in the legal effects of marriage will be
followed by a treatment of the new statutory grounds for divorce and
the economic effects of divorce. The paper will conclude with a brief
discussion of court organization and procedures under the new act.
I. CHANGES IN THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF MARRIAGE
While most of the Marriage and Family Law Reform is con-
cerned with marriage dissolution, certain important changes are
also made in the legal effects of marriage.9 The significance of these
changes perhaps lies more in their reflection of changes in marriage
behavior and ideals in West Germany than in their specific practical
consequences. The new provisions on the marriage name and on the
mutual rights and duties of the spouses, both personal and eco-
nomic, alter the marriage model previously embodied in the Civil
Code.
A. The Marriage Name
One of the most controversial changes made by the Reform Law
is the revision of the law of married persons' names. In the end, the
1976 reform fell short of fully implementing sex equality in this area.
I Unlike the new provisions on divorce which were effective from July 1, 1977 onward,
the revisions in the law of married persons' names went into effect on July 1, 1976. See text
apd notes at notes 10-16 infra. Effective dates and transitional provisions are contained in 1.
EHERG, supra note 1, art. 12.
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The Civil Code of 1896 incorporated into law the traditional
custom by which a woman assumed her husband's surname upon
marriage and his surname became that of the children. Prior to the
1976 Reform Law, Section 1355 of the Civil Code had read:
The marriage and family name is the name of the husband.
The wife is authorized to add her maiden name to the name of
the husband by declaration before the Registrar
(Standesbeamte); the declaration must be publicly authenti-
cated (beglaubigt).10
This provision had long been considered to be of doubtful con-
stitutionality, but achieving a legislative consensus to remedy the
defect turned out to be difficult. The provisions of the government
draft bill on name law were a major source of contention between
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. By the version finally adopted,
the law governing marriage formation was amended to require the
Registrar to ask the spouses before the marriage is celebrated
whether they wish to make a declaration concerning the marriage
name they will bear." Their choice is limited to the name of the wife
or the name of the husband. The one whose name is not chosen has
the option of adding his or her name to the marriage name. Section
1355 now reads:
§ 1355. (1) The spouses bear a common family name (the
marriage name).
(2) The spouses can designate as the marriage name, by
declaration to the Registrar at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the birth name of the husband or the birth name of
the wife. If they make no designation, the marriage name is the
birth name of the husband. The birth name is the name re-
corded on the birth cirtificates of the intended spouses at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.
(3) A spouse, whose birth name is not the marriage
name, can, by declaration to the Registrar, place his birth
name or the name he bears at the time of the celebration of the
marriage in front of the marriage name; the declaration must
be publicly authenticated.
(4) A widowed or divorced spouse retains the marriage
, The requirement of authentication demands that the declaration be in writing and
that the signature be attested to by a notary or, as here, by the Registrar. Bfirgerliches
Gesetzbuch (Civil Code) [BGB] § 129 (W. Ger.).
1 EHEG, supra note 4, § 13a inserted by 1. EheRG, supra note 1, art. 3(4). Marriage
formation remains governed by the provisions of the 1938/1946 marriage legislation, but is
eventually expected to be the subject of further reform legislation.
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name. He can, by declaration to the Registrar, take back his
birth name or the name borne at the time of the celebration of
the marriage; the declaration must be publicly authenticated.
Thus, if the couple does not make a declaration concerning
their marriage name, the husband's birth name becomes the mar-
riage name by operation of law. This final version of section 1355
compromised two basic features of the government's 1973 draft bill.
Under the draft bill, in addition to the option of choosing the hus-
band's or wife's name, the spouses had a third choice: a double
marriage name composed of the names of both, but which could
contain no more than two names." The draft bill also provided that
where the spouses did not make a joint declaration concerning their
marriage name, the name would be a double name composed of the
names of both spouses, with the husband's name standing first. 13
The draft bill would thus have eliminated the channelling effect
created by limiting the choice to the husband's or the wife's name
when tradition has so long fostered the wife's taking the husband's
name. It also would have more nearly approached the ideal of sex
equality with its provision that, in the absence of choice, a double
name (albeit with the husband's name first), rather than the hus-
band's name, would apply.
West German treatment of the marital name was complicated
by the fact that, unlike England, France, and the American states
(with the exception of Hawaii), Germany, in its Civil Code had
given the social custom concerning married women's names the
force of law. In contrast, the English common law rule, received in
the United States, has been that any person may use any surname
he or she desires so long as the use is nonfraudulent.4 In France, in
further contrast, a woman's legal name does not change upon mar-
riage though she has a limited right to use her husband's surname
during the marriage if she wishes. 5 Indeed it was a controversial
feature of the 1976 French Divorce Reform law that under special
circumstances, a divorced wife may continue to use her former hus-
band's name with judicial permission."
In West Germany, however, the mandate of a common name
12 See B6hmer, Die Neuregelung des Eheschliessungsrechts, 28 DAS STANDESAMT 5, 9
(1975).
13 Id.
" The cases are collected in Daum, The Right of Married Women to Assert Their Own
Surnames, 8 J. LAw REFORM 63, 66-67 (1974).
11 See Glendon, The French Divorce Reform Law of 1976, 24 AM. J. CoMP. L. 199, 220-
21 (1976).
" Id.
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in former section 1355 of the Code of 1896 came to be valued as an
expression of the unity of the spouses and the family. In trying to
implement sex equality, reformers were reluctant to give up the
ideal of the common name or to affect the smooth functioning of the
comprehensive national registration and identification system. The
price paid for administrative convenience and the symbolism of
community, however, was the retention, in subsection (2), of the
symbolism of the subordination of the wife to the husband, thus
laying the constitutionality of new section 1355 open to question.
Furthermore, though subsection (1) still transmits the principle
that the spouses should bear a common name, the principle itself
is eroded in subsection (3).
B. Marriage Roles and Responsibilities
As it stood at the time of the 1976 reform, Title Five of the Civil
Code on the "Effects of Marriage in General" obliged the spouses
to live in "matrimonial community of life. ' 17 Under the Code provi-
sions, life in this community was organized around the model of
what has come to be called "housewife-and-maintenance mar-
riage," (Hausfrauen-und- Versorgungsehe). Section 1356 stated that
the wife's responsibility was to run the household and that she had
the right to be employed"8 outside the household only insofar as this
was consistent with her duties in the marriage and the family. To
aid her in fulfilling these duties, the wife was given the "power of
the keys," (Schltisselgewalt), that is, the legal authority to bind her
husband in transactions within the scope of her household responsi-
bility. 9 Though both spouses were obligated to contribute to the
support of the family, the Code provided that the wife generally
fulfilled her support duty by running the household."
The official allocation of sex roles according to traditional no-
tions survived the Equality Law of 1957,21 which had eliminated the
more obviously discriminatory aspects of West German family law.
But the constitutionality of these code sections and their appropri-
ateness for modern conditions were increasingly questioned. In a
commentary on the new law, Justice Minister Hans-Jochen Vogel
11 BGB § 1353 before it was amended by the 1. EheRG, supra note 1 [hereafter pre-1976
sections will be referred to as "former section"].
"1 The terms "employment," "to be employed," etc., are used throughout this article to
refer to self-employment as well as employment by another. The German term is
Beschrftigung.
11 BGB former § 1357.
20 BGB former § 1360.
21 See text and note at note 8 supra.
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stated that although at the time these provisions seemed to the
legislature merely to explain what was then meant by the phrase
"matrimonial community of life," by 1974 it had become clear that,
with increased numbers of married women employed outside the
home, the model of marriage embodied in the Code was unsuita-
ble.22 In keeping with this perception, the new law does not officially
sanction any particular marriage model or any particular allocation
of decisionmaking powers or division of labor within the marriage.
Consistent with the trends that are transforming husband-and-wife
law throughout the industrialized Western world, the 1976 law with-
drew most legal guidelines, leaving these matters to be worked out
by the individuals involved.
Nevertheless, as Justice Minister Vogel has observed, a new
family law in a pluralistic society can be expected to bear the marks
of that pluralism and of the struggle that it can engender.? As
mentioned above, the Code provisions on the General Effects of
Marriage now open with the statement that marriage is concluded
for life. The section goes on to state, as did the prior law, the obliga-
tion to live in marital community. But a new paragraph (2) signals
that this community may not have the same meaning under the new
law that it had under the old:
§ 1353. (1) Marriage is concluded for a lifetime. The spouses
are mutually bound to a matrimonial community of life.
(2) One spouse is not bound to comply with the demand
of the other spouse for the establishment of the community, if
the demand constitutes an abuse of right or if the marriage has
foundered.24
Changes in succeeding sections confirm that the former idea of
marital community has been relativized and made sex-neutral. Sec-
tion 1356, which had charged the wife with responsibility for run-
ning the household and limited her right to be employed outside the
home, now provides:
§ 1356. (1) The spouses regulate the running of the household
by mutual agreement. If the running of the household is left to
one of the spouses, that spouse manages the household on his
own responsibility.
22 Vogel, Das Erste Gesetz zur Reform des Ehe- und Familienrechts vom 14. Juni 1976
(I. EheRG), 23 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR DAS GESAMTE FAmumENRECHT 481, 482 (1976).
SId.
24 The concept of "foundering" (Scheitern) in the new law and its relationship to
"breakdown" (Zerrilttung) is discussed infra at note 36.
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(2) Both spouses have the right to be employed. In the
choice and exercise of an occupation they must pay due regard
to the interests of the other spouse and the family.
Under the new version of section 1357, both spouses, not just the
wife, are given the power to represent each other in household trans-
actions, unless they contractually exclude it.
In addition, the rules about economic support during the mar-
riage were reorganized. The 1957 Equality Law had already replaced
the idea that one spouse (the husband) should support the family
with the idea that each spouse should support the other, but it did
so in a way that presupposed the traditional division of sex roles:
§ 1360. The spouses are mutually obliged to appropriately
maintain the family by their work and property. As a rule, the
wife fulfills her obligation to contribute to the maintenance of
the family through labor by managing the household. She is
obliged to engage in a gainful activity only insofar as the work-
ing capacity of the husband and the income of the family do
not suffice for the maintenance of the family, and insofar as an
inroad into their capital is not commensurate with the circum-
stances of the spouses.
§ 1360a. The proper (angemessene) maintenance of the fam-
ily includes all that is required in the circumstances of the
spouses to cover the costs of the household and to satisfy the
personal needs of the spouses and the support of those common
children of theirs who are entitled to be supported.
Maintenance is to be supplied in that fashion which is
demanded by the marital community of life. The husband is
obliged to make available to the wife his contribution to the
common maintenance of the family for a reasonable
(angemessenen) period of time in advance.
§ 1360b. If one spouse furnishes for the maintenance of the
family more than he is obliged to furnish, it is to be presumed
in case of doubt that he does not intend to obtain restitution
from the other spouse.
The Reform Law has amended section 1360 to eliminate those
sex-based classifications:
§ 1360. The spouses are mutually obliged to appropriately
maintain the family through their work and with their prop-
erty. If the managing of the household is left to one spouse, that
spouse as a rule fulfills his obligation to contribute to the main-
tenance of the family through labor by managing the house-
hold.
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In a similar vein, section 1360a, paragraph 2, sentence 2 has been
amended to provide:
The spouses are mutually obliged to make available, for a
reasonable period of time in advance, the necessary means for
the common maintenance of the family.
In keeping with the notion that spouses are two equal and inde-
pendent individuals associated in a joint enterprise, the new guiding
principle governing economic relations between husband and wife
thus seems to be that there is a mutual duty to contribute to house-
hold expenses, rather than a mutual duty to support one another.
In making these changes, West Germany is in step with well-
established trends now transforming American as well as West
European family law-the implementation of sex equality, and the
adoption of legal neutrality with respect to marriage models and sex
roles. Indeed, in the Western non-socialist world, West Germany led
the way toward equalizing the legal positions of men and women in
the family through its Constitution of 1949 and the Equality Law
of 1957. Until the 1957 law, most Western legislation regulating in-
terspousal personal and economic relationships during marriage
gave the husband the dominant role in such matters as the choice
of residence and the management and control of marital property.
Since that time, however, there has been a rapid modernization of
the traditional law of the ongoing marriage throughout Western
Europe and in the United States, as more egalitarian laws typically
replace the express or implicit stereotyping of sex-roles and family
types. Implementation of sex equality has generally been followed
in the law by a move toward lifestyle neutrality. In code-based
systems, like those of West Germany, France, Italy, and Spain,
legislatures have replaced the traditional law with a new model of
a marital "community" in which there is no fixed pattern of role
distribution. This movement has been variously explained in differ-
ent legal systems as a response to the actual diversity of marriage
and family types in society, as a necessary consequence of current
notions of privacy, individual liberty or sex equality, or as the effect
of a combination of these factors. In West Germany, the slogan,
carried over from the Civil Code of 1896, that marriage is a com-
munity of life, now presides over marriage laws that mirror the
present-day tension, in families and in society, between the ideals
of "community of interest" and full self-realization of the individ-
ual. In the West German Constitution itself, there is a certain stress,
not necessarily amounting to a contradiction, between the individ-
ual's constitutional rights to sex equality and the "free unfolding of
his personality" on the one hand, and the constitutional grant of the
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"special protection of the state" to marriage and the family, on the
other.25 In the 1976 reform law, too, political compromise produced
a document that reflects society's aspiration for marriages to last a
lifetime and its practical desire to provide a decent burial for those
that do not. The social ideal of community and cooperation within
marriage is tempered by the recognition that marriages and families
are composed of individuals with their own distinctive needs and
desires.
H. GROUNDS OF DIVORCE
Until the wave of divorce law reform that began with the Eng-
lish Divorce Reform Act of 1969, West German divorce law was
widely regarded as one of the most liberal systems in the Western
countries. Divorce on the no-fault ground of insanity had been per-
mitted for the entire country under the German Civil Code since
1900, whereas in France the idea of divorce on the limited ground
of impairment of one partner's mental faculties was still controver-
sial when it was introduced in 1976.26 Marriage breakdown
(Zerrattung) following a three-year period of separation had been a
ground of divorce in Germany since the marriage legislation of
1938.27 One of the most interesting aspects of the 1976 West German
reform is that it repealed a system resembling the divorce reform
legislation adopted in England in 1969 and in France in 1975.28 With
its combination of fault-based and objective grounds, the su-
perseded German law also resembled the divorce law existing in the
majority of American states.
A brief description of the provisions and operation of the Mar-
riage Law of 1938, as retained in 1946, is helpful in understanding
why West Germany decisively rejected the scheme so popular else-
where. Under the 1938/1946 law, divorce was available for two
types of matrimonial misconduct and for two situations in which
neither partner was charged with fault. The two fault bases for di-
vorce were adultery and the generalized ground of "serious marital
misconduct or dissolute or immoral behavior such that the guilty
party has so deeply disrupted the marriage that one cannot expect
the restoration of that community of life which is implicit in the
2 GRUNDGESETrZ arts. 2, 3 & 6.
2 Glendon, supra note 15, at 206-07.
2 EheG, supra note 5, § 48.
2 The English Divorce Reform Act, 1969, now consolidated into the Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1973, is discussed in P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 206-24 (4th ed. 1971); the French legisla-
tion, adopted in 1975 and effective in 1976, is discussed in Glendon, supra note 15.
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nature of marriage." 9 The two objective, or no-fault, grounds for
divorce were (1) the physical or mental impairmentof the defendant
or (2) breakdown of the marriage and three years' separation." The
version of the latter ground replaced by the 1976 reform read as
follows:
§ 48.* (1) If the domestic community of the marriage partners
has been interrupted for three years and if, owing to a deep-
rooted incurable breakdown (Zerrfittung) of marital relations,
restoration of such a community of life as is implicit in the
nature of marriage cannot be expected, either of the marriage
partners may petition for divorce.
(2) If the spouse petitioning for divorce is wholly or pre-
dominantly guilty of bringing about the breakdown, the di-
vorce cannot be granted against the other spouse's opposition,
except if the opposing spouse lacks attachment to the mar-
riage, and such readiness to continue it as may fairly be ex-
pected of him or her (amended in 1961) .31
(3) The petition for divorce must not be granted if on a
true understanding of the interests of one or several minor chil-
dren of the marriage the maintenance of the marriage is re-
quired (added by the Allied Control Council Law of 1946).
This well-known and much-discussed provision has been re-
sponsible for the characterization of West German divorce law as
"liberal" in comparison with the laws of England, France, and cer-
tain American states that remained exclusively fault-based until
the reforms of the 1970s. In reality, however, section 48 has not
played a very important role in practice in West Germany. In fact,
the history of section 48 is suggestive of the probable fate of divorce
law reforms that merely tack objective grounds onto fault grounds.
In the first place, section 48, for all its notoriety, was little used.
In 1968, for instance, the claim of marital breakdown figured in only
4.4 percent of all divorces,32 while the general misconduct basis ac-
counted for 93 percent. 3 It has been estimated that, as in England,
France, and the United States, about ninety percent of all divorces
in West Germany are uncontested. 4 Though most of these divorces
are by mutual agreement, they are frequently disguised as divorces
EheG, supra note 5, §§ 42, 43.
Id., §§ 44-46, 48.
3' Familienrechtsanderungsgesetz, supra note 6, art. 2, § 1(g), incorporating case law
that had made it difficult for a plaintiff to overcome the defendant's opposition in contested
divorce cases.
11 M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABIuTY, DIVoCaE AND THE LAW 393 (1972).
3 Id.
34 Id. at 248, 251.
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for marital misconduct. Such divorces were preferred in West Ger-
many because they were the short route to divorce, given section
48's requirement of three years' separation. Judicial hostility to the
breakdown ground contributed to the unpopularity of section 48 for
a time..In a trend that had reversed before the 1976 reform, courts
had reintroduced fault considerations by their interpretations of the
vague language of section 48(2) and by broadly exercising their dis-
cretion to deny divorces under paragraphs 48(2) and (3).
The coalition government's divorce reform program proceeded
on the premise that the breakdown principle should be strengthened
and that fault considerations should be eliminated not only from
divorce but from the effects of divorce as well. Although controversy
surrounded the reform program, by 1976 there was no serious oppo-
sition in principle. West Germany, like Sweden, California, and
those American states that have adopted the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act, was ready to replace the prior specific grounds for
divorce with a single objective ground: Scheitern (foundering, or
failure) of the marriage.
The new basis for divorce is set forth in five sections reinserted
in the Civil Code at the place left vacant when the original substan-
tive divorce law of the German Civil Code of 1896 was repealed by
the Marriage Law of 1938:
§ 1564. A marriage can be dissolved only by the judgment of
a court upon the petition of one or both spouses. The marriage
is dissolved when the judgment becomes final. The conditions
under which divorce can be sought are set forth in the following
provisions.
§ 1565. (1) A marriage can be terminated, if it has foun-
dered (wenn sie gescheitert ist). A marriage has foundered if
the community of life, of the spouses no longer exists and it
cannot be expected that the spouses will reestablish it.
(2) If the spouses have lived apart for less than one year,
the marriage can only be dissolved if the continuation of the
marriage would present an insupportable hardship
[unzumutbare Htrte] for the petitioner for reasons which re-
pose in the person of the other spouse.
§ 1566. (1) It is irrebuttably presumed that the marriage
has foundered, if the spouses have lived apart for one year and
both spouses petition for divorce or the respondent consents to
the divorce.
(2) It is irrebuttably presumed that the marriage has
foundered, if the spouses have lived apart for three years.
§ 1567. (1) The spouses are living apart, if no household
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community exists between them and one spouse perceptibly
refuses its restoration because he rejects the marital com-
munity of life. The household community no longer exists in
such case even if the spouses live apart within the marital
dwelling.
(2) Cohabitation for a short time, that should serve the
reconciliation of the spouses, does not interrupt or stop the
time periods specified in § 1566.
§ 1568. (1) The marriage may not be dissolved, although
it has foundered, if and so long as the maintenance of the
marriage is exceptionally necessary for special reasons in the
interest of minor children produced by the marriage, or if and
so long as the dissolution would pose such severe hardship for
the respondent who opposes it, by reason of extraordinary cir-
cumstances, that the maintenance of the marriage, even taking
into consideration the interests of the petitioner, appears ex-
ceptionally required.
(2) Paragraph (1) is not applicable if the spouses have
lived apart for more than five years.
A. The General Clause, Section 1565(1)
The new guiding principle for the dissolution of marriage is
contained in section 1565(1). The former system of differentiated
grounds, absolute and relative,35 fault and no-fault, has been re-
placed by a single ground in a general clause: a marriage can be
dissolved if it has "foundered."
Although the reform law uses a new term, "Scheitern" (foun-
dering), rather than "Zerrattung" (breakdown), the term used in
repealed section 48, the concepts are said to be similar in content."
Thus it can be expected that the interpretation of Zerrlittung under
prior law will be relevant in interpreting the new law. In particular,
the reasons for the foundering of the marriage and the fact that only
one partner may consider the marriage to have foundered should
continue to be irrelevant in principle, as they were under the old
no-fault provision. The legislature is said to have chosen the term
Scheitern merely to emphasize that failure of a marriage may come
about through a course of events over which the spouses have no
3 Absolute grounds encompassed those matrimonial offenses which per se entitled the
legally innocent spouse to a divorce-for example, adultery. Relative grounds included those
violations of matrimonial duties which entitled the innocent spouse to a divorce only if they
had led to the breakdown of the marriage.
39 Indeed, Vogel states that the concepts are identical. See Vogel, supra note 22, at 483.
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influence, or through their incompatibility of character, and that it
is often a misfortune for both.3 1
By the terms of section 1565(1) a marriage has foundered if two
conditions are present: the community of life of the spouses no
longer exists and it is not expected that they will restore it. It seems
that the existence of these two conditions must be established by
proof of facts concerning the marital relationship except in those
cases where the irrebuttable presumptions of section 1566(1) and (2)
operate. In theory, at least, it must be proved that the alleged break-
down is genuine.
In the special case where the spouses have lived apart (as that
concept is defined in secton 1567)38 for less than a year, section
1565(2) qualifies the requirements of the general clause of section
1565(1). The petitioner in such a case must show, in addition to the
two conditions required by section 1565(1), that the continuation of
the marriage would be an insupportable hardship for him or her for
reasons that repose in the person of the other spouse. This section,
not a part of the original government bill, was added in a late
compromise with the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian
Social Union. The addition of this "extra requirement" for divorce
has been criticized as amounting to a limited reintroduction of fault
notions.3 1
B. The Presumptions of Section 1566
Substitution of breakdown grounds for specific fault grounds
does not necessarily eliminate "fault" or "guilt" elements from mar-
riage dissolution proceedings. Unless the law provides otherwise, the
petitioner still must allege facts upon which the legal conclusion of
"breakdown" can be based. If the facts and conclusion are contested
by the other party, the petitioner then must bring in evidence to
support his case. Thus, the aggravation of antagonism between the
former marriage partners and the revelation of embarrassing or inti-
mate details of their private family life theoretically can be present
in a marriage dissolution system from which "fault" has been ex-
plicitly eliminated. The irrebuttable presumptions of section
1566(1) and (2) are addressed to this problem. These presumptions
make presentation of the factual basis for breakdown unnecessary
and the allegation of breakdown incontestable whenever the spouses
:0 Diederichsen, Das Recht der Ehescheidung nach dem 1. EheRG (Scheidungsgrrinde),
30 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIT [NJW] 273, 274 (1977).
See text preceding note 35 supra.
Die Zeit, April 23, 1976, at 1 (Overseas ed.).
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have lived apart for the designated periods of time: (1) one year, if
both spouses are seeking the divorce or the respondent agrees to the
divorce; (2) three years, if only one spouse is seeking the divorce and
the other does not agree to it. The presumptions are conclusive: once
the separation period has been established, evidence to show that
the marriage has not broken down despite the running of the time
period is not admissible. 0 It is to be noted, however, that the drafts-
men contemplated that the court would investigate the strict ob-
servance of the separation period.4' If complete separation of the
spouses for the required period cannot be established, the case re-
mains governed by the basic provisions of section 1565.42 The effect
of the presumption in section 1566(2) (but not of 1566(1)) is miti-
gated somewhat by the power of the judge, under the revised rules
of civil procedure, to postpone a suit based on the fact of three years'
separation if he is of the opinion that chances still exist for the
marriage. 3
C. The "Hardship Clause" of Section 1568
Even though the breakdown of marriage is conclusively pre-
sumed under section 1566 or factually demonstrated under section
1565, the marriage may not be dissolved if the exceptional circum-
stances detailed in section 1568 obtain unless the couple has lived
apart for five years. The exceptional circumstances that may delay
a divorce for the longer period of separation are of two kinds: where
"the maintenance of the marriage is exceptionally necessary for
40 Diederichsen, supra note 37, at 276.
I' d.
42 Id.
1 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] § 614 as amended by 1. EheRG, supra note 1, art. 6.
Under this section the judge cannot, however, postpone a divorce against the wishes of both
spouses if they have lived apart for a year ( § 614 (2)(ii)).
§ 614 (1) The court shall postpone proceedings for the establishment of the marital
life on its own motion, if this is appropriate for the amicable settlement of the proceed-
ings.
(2) The court shall postpone divorce proceedings on its own motion, if it is con-
vinced that there is a prospect for the continuation of the marriage. If the spouses live
apart for more than a year, the proceedings must not be postponed against the objections
of both spouses.
(3) If the petitioner has moved for the postponement of the proceedings, the court
must not decide the petition for the establishment [of the marital life] or grant the
divorce, before the proceedings have been postponed.
(4) The postponement may be repeated only once. It must not exceed one year
altogether and, in the case of separation of more than three years, it must not exceed
six months.
(5) In connection with the postponement, the court shall as a rule suggest to the
spouses the use of a marital counselling service.
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special reasons in the interest of minor children" of the marriage,
or where the divorce would pose for the respondent "such severe
hardship by reason of extraordinary circumstances, that the main-
tenance of the marriage . . . appears exceptionally required." The
section's redundancy shows the scars of legislative battles over its
content."
Under the prior law, a marriage that had broken down was not
to be dissolved so long as the opposing spouse had "attachment to
the marriage" and readiness to continue it. 4 A more pragmatic view
prevailed in the reform law. After the spouses have lived apart for
five years, a divorce cannot be denied the petitioning spouse regard-
less of the hardship it may be claimed will befall the children or the
objecting spouse. In this regard, section 1568 is said to reflect a
practical judgment that matters concerning a foundered marriage
ought to be "settled," permitting the regularization of new unions
which the spouses may have entered."
Because of the five-year limit, the most that the hardship
clause offers to a spouse opposed to divorce is the possibility of
delay. But, as the repetitious language of the clause indicates, this
delay is to be available only under extremely limited circumstances.
Thus, it seems that the court, in determining whether the
"exceptional" conditions required by section 1568(1) are present,
must disregard the usual psychic and economic effects of marriage
dissolution upon the children and the opposing spouse. It is too soon
to say how the courts will apply the clause within the narrow limits
left to them.
D. "Living Apart": Section 1567
Reference is repeatedly made in the 1976 reform legislation to
the concept of "living apart": as a general rule, a marriage cannot
be dissolved if the spouses have not "lived apart" for a year
(1565(2)); presumptions of marriage breakdown arise if the spouses
have "lived apart" for one or three years, depending on whether
both spouses or only one spouse seeks the termination of the mar-
riage (1566(1) and (2)); the hardship clause of section 1568 is not
applicable after the spouses have "lived apart" five years; special
" Diederichsen, supra note 37, at 278.
See text following note 30 supra.
" Diederichsen, supra note 37, at 278. Thus, the legislative conception of marriage disso-
lution proceedings under the new law has been likened to a kind of "marriage bankruptcy,"
in which the broken-down marriage is "liquidated," with financial matters, child-related
matters and the marriage termination itself included in a single judgment. Id. at 273.
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rules are established in sections 1361 and 1361a for support and
household goods where the spouses "live apart." The meaning of
this term is set forth in section 1567.
The section was drafted so as to clear up ambiguities that ex-
isted under the prior law in two situations: where the spouses con-
tinue to occupy the same dwelling, and where they resume cohabita-
tion for a short time. Under the reform law, a marriage can have
legally "foundered" even though the parties are still living under the
same roof, because "living apart" is so defined that no period of
living in different dwellings is necessary before a divorce can be
granted. Where it is claimed that the spouses have "lived apart"
within the same dwelling, however, it is probable that complete
factual separation of their lives will have to be shown.17 Thus the
statutory requirements are likely to be met if the spouses divide the
home, sharing only the kitchen and bath facilities, but not if a wife
continues to cook, launder, and shop for her husband.18 It is said
that continued cooperation of the spouses in the interests of com-
mon children or a family business will not necessarily be evidence
against "living apart."4 As for resumed cohabitation during the
period of separation, the reform law provides that cohabitation for
a short time with the aim of reconciliation will not toll the running
of the separation period.
Mere physical separation of the spouses due to illness, war, or
the occupation of a spouse does not of itself destroy the "household
community" or constitute evidence of "living apart" within the
meaning of section 1567.50 To convert such a physical separation
into "living apart," a spouse must manifest in an unmistakable
manner his intent to do so.51
E. Summary
Viewed in conjunction with recent reforms pertaining to the
grounds of divorce in several other Western countries, these new
West German divorce provisions are part of a process that appears
to be transforming marriage from a relationship terminable only for
serious cause to a relationship dissoluble at will. By more fully
eliminating consideration of marital misconduct and by extending
unilateral no-fault divorce to a limited degree, 52 West Germany has
17 Id. at 277.
4x Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
1 See BGB § 1566(2).
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gone further on the spectrum of change than England, France, and
most American states, where present divorce law resembles the
1938/1946 German law.
The new West German law, by its use of conclusive presump-
tions,53 provides for even less judicial intrusion into the termination
of marriage than does the American Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act, which, in form, still requires judicial inquest into the fact of
marriage breakdown.-4
When one compares West German divorce law with that of
Sweden, however, one finds that, in addition to eliminating marital
misconduct as a ground for divorce, Sweden has minimized state
regulation of marriage dissolution even further. In 1973, Sweden
repealed a liberal law under which the principal ground of divorce
was factual breakdown of the marriage (proved by a period of sepa-
ration and the mutual consent of the parties) and unilateral divorce
was obtainable with little difficulty.55 The Swedish reform law,
which went into effect on January 1, 1974, made unilateral divorce
a matter of legal right. 6 No fault need be alleged; no "reasons," such
as breakdown of the marriage, need be given. Thus, the court need
not even appear to make findings concerning these matters. There
is no waiting period for a divorce unless one spouse opposes the
petition or has custody of children under 16 years of age. Even in
these cases, the petitioner need only observe a six-month waiting
period, after which the court has no discretion to deny a divorce.
Political compromise in West Germany produced a law that is far
from furnishing the no-fault, no-reasons, no-inquest divorce avail-
able with little or no delay in Sweden. Nevertheless, the West Ger-
man divorce reform represents a conscious retreat from official in-
volvement in marriage dissolution.
In evaluating recent reforms of the grounds for divorce, it is
essential to distinguish between divorce as an event that terminates
marriage, and divorce as an event that triggers economic and child-
related consequences. While there seems to be a clear trend, of
varying degrees in different countries, toward less regulation of mar-
riage termination as such, a consensus is emerging that economic
and child-related matters are the crucial issues for legal and social
53 Id.
See UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 305 and comment thereto.
" The former Swedish system is described in detail in M. RHEINSTEIN, supra note 32, at
126.
" For a description of the Swedish family law reform of 1973, effective in 1974, see M.
GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMIY: FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION IN THE UNITED STATES AND
WESTERN EuROPE 222 (1977).
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policy. As to these matters, most recent reforms are characterized
not by a lessening of but by an increase in state intervention. This
is especially true of the new West German treatment of economic
issues, as the next sections of this article demonstrate. Indeed, when
the new grounds of divorce are read with the new provisions on the
economic aspects of divorce, it may be concluded that, overall, di-
vorce in West Germany has been made more difficult, or at least
more expensive. Unhappy spouses, though generally saved from
having to disclose embarrasing details of their personal lives in
court, may have been delivered into the hands of bureaucrats and
lawyers.
III. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE
In West Germany, as in the United States, post-divorce support
has been recognized to be a precarious remedy. The enforceability
of periodic payments for an indefinite future is uncertain for the
claimant, traditionally the wife, and payments can turn out to be a
crushing burden for the debtor, traditionally the husband, and for
the new family he may establish. For both sides, a continuing post-
divorce financial relationship can be a persistent source of litigation
and bitter memories. Like the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
in the United States and divorce reform acts in England, France,
and other countries, the West German reform act tries to shift the
weight of post-divorce economics from a continuing duty of support
to a once-and-for-all settlement at the time of divorce.
A. Settlement of Property and Pension Benefits
The basic step in this direction had already been taken by the
West German Equal Rights Law of 1957. Up to that time, marriage
did not bring about an amalgamation of the property of the husband
and the wife, unless the parties had so arranged by solemn marital
contract. 5 In the overwhelming majority of marriages, the combined
property of husband and wife was managed by the husband, but
title remained separate. Upon termination of the marriage, the hus-
band walked away with his assets and the wife with hers. But what
did the wife own if the husband, as breadwinner, had accumulated
savings while she earned nothing during years of caring for house-
hold and children? Clearly, in the great majority of cases, the wife's
post-divorce support could be assured only by giving her a claim for
periodic payments against her former husband. The claim was de-
1, BGB former §§ 1363 ff.
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nied, however, if her misconduct was held to have brought about the
breakdown of the marriage.
The Equal Rights Law of 195711 changed this traditional system
of marital property law by introducing a system of
Zugewinnausgleich, an "equalization of increase" that may be ex-
cluded by marital contract. Like the Nordic laws of the earlier part
of the twentieth century, this system combines the essential fea-
tures of separation of assets-individual ownership and manage-
ment during marriage, limited in some respects-with a sort of
community property sharing upon divorce and, in certain cases,
upon death. If, by his gainful activity, one spouse has increased the
value of his estate more than the other spouse has, the one who has
achieved the greater "increase" must pay the other spouse one-half
of the difference. No partition of jointly owned assets is necessary
upon marriage termination; the equalization of property increase is
brought about by a simple arithmetic computation and the pay-
ment of a sum of money. If a husband accumulated savings while
his housewife spouse earned nothing, he must, upon divorce, pay her
a sum of money equal to one-half of the savings he achieved during
their marriage. If both parties earned wages and increased their
estates, the increases of each are computed and compared, and the
party whose increase was greater pays one-half the difference to the
other.59
The Zugewinnausgleich system presupposes that there are
property assets whose value can be computed. But this assumption
becomes problematic when savings are represented not by tradi-
tional assets of real or personal property but by rights to or prospects
of future annuities or pensions. In a steadily increasing number of
households this "new property" has become a more important
means of savings than traditional types of property. The prospect
of a pension payable at retirement age or possibly at the time of an
earlier incapacity constitutes a significant, or even the principal,
saving of many families. However, pensions were not subject to
division under the 1957 Zugewinnausgleich. Upon divorce, each
spouse retained his or her own entitlements. Where a divorced wife
had had little outside employment she was frequently left without
security for old age and was forced to seek public aid. That there
were over 308,000 divorced women over 55 in West Germany at the
end of 1973 and only 13,600 of them were receiving pensions in 1974
GleichberG, supra note 8.
' BGB §§ 1363-70, 1372-84 (incorporating amendments made by the Equality Law of
1957), supra note 8.
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indicates the scope of this problem."0
West Germany and other countries have found it difficult to
include this kind of savings in the property settlement upon divorce.
The reform law of 1976 perhaps opened a way out of these difficul-
ties. Vested rights in future pension benefits and even contingent
expectations of pensions for which the foundation has been laid
during marriage are now the subject matter of a program of
"equalization of security benefits" (Versorgungsausgleich). The new
institution requires that such rights and expectations of divorcing
spouses be appraised, compared with each other, and equalized
insofar as they have been accumulated during marriage.'
1587. (1) An equalization of security benefits takes place be-
tween divorced spouses, insofar as, for one or both of them,
expectations or prospects for maintenance for old age or voca-
tional or occupational incapacity of the type enumerated in §
1587a(2)62 are established in or are to be preserved through the
marriage (Ehezeit). Expectations or prospects which are estab-
lished or preserved neither with the help of the property nor
through the work of the spouses remain outside consideration.
(2) Marriage (Ehezeit), in the sense of the provisions on
the equalization of security benefits, includes the time from the
beginning of the month in which the marriage was celebrated
to the end of the month in which the divorce decree went into
legal effect.
(3) Only the following provisions are to apply to expecta-
tions or prospects upon which equalization of security benefits
takes place; the provisions of the marital property law are not
applicable.
The idea is simple, but the statutory scheme is complex and
implementation is difficult. Though the underlying theory of the
equalization of security benefits is the same as that of the equaliza-
tion of property increase, the new institution has been organized by
the reform law of 1976 to operate independently of the older equali-
" Ruland, Der Versorgungsausgleich, 29 NJW 1713 (1976).
1 BGB §§ 1587-1587p (incorporating amendments made by the 1. EheRG, supra note
1). See generally Belchaus, Einfihrung in den Versorgungsausgleich, 30 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR
DEUTSCHEs REcHT 793 (1976); Ruland, supra note 60. The provisions are to apply in principle
to all divorces after the effective date of the law, with transitional provisions for cases where
the spouses have lived apart for a long period. Constitutional objections have been raised,
however, to the equalization of benefits between spouses who were married prior to the time
the new rules went into effect. See, e.g., Miller, Verfassungswidrigkeit des Versorgungs-
ausgleichs bei "Altehen"? 30 NJW 1745 (1977).
,2 See text at note 65 infra.
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zation. A parallel doctrine developing in the caselaw of American
community property jurisdictions," as well as in the so-called com-
mon law states," treats pension rights and expectations established
during marriage as assets or property existing at the time of divorce.
Under the West German system, however, increases in pension ben-
efits are to be computed, compared, and equalized separately from
all other assets. The actuarial processes for ascertaining the mone-
tary value of future pension rights and prospects acquired during
marriage are regulated by elaborate provisions for each type of bene-
fit: social security, civil service, armed forces, pension funds estab-
lished by private employers, private annuity insurance, and so on. 5
Once the values of the pension rights and prospects both spouses
acquired during the marriage have been ascertained, these values
are compared with each other. One-half of the difference between
the higher and the lower value is transferred from the pension ac-
count of the spouse with the higher value to the pension account of
the spouse with the lower value. If no pension account yet exists for
that latter spouse, a new one is established for her or him. As a
general rule, the new account to which the transfer is made will be
established in the general social security system in which almost the
entire population participates." The account that receives a transfer
is independent of the account from which the transfer is made.
Thus, if the latter account is contingent or vested subject to divest-
ment, its failure to vest or its divestment does not affect the account
to which the transfer has been made.
In a typical situation of a wife who established a pension ac-
count of her own through employment before marriage, but stopped
adding to it during marriage, transfer from her divorced husband's
account will increase her future pension, and post-divorce employ-
ment will result in further additions. On the other side, the decrease
in the husband's account, and thus of his future pension, may be
replenished eventually by his voluntary payment of the requisite
amounts into his account.
By providing for separate pension accounts, the statutory
scheme attempts to make the rights of the obligee-spouse indepen-
E.g., In re Marria of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976);
Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977); Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 661 (Texas
1977); Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5
Wash. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971).
" E.g., Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1976); Kruger v.
Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977).
BGB § 1587a (inserted by 1. EheRG, supra note 1).
" Id., § 1587b (inserted by 1. EheRG, supra note 1).
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dent of the fate of the obligor's pension rights or prospects. In some
cases, however, the transfer of part of one spouse's existing pension
account to the social insurance account of the other spouse is not
possible. If a pension account has been established with a foreign
insurance carrier, for example, it cannot be affected by a decree of
a West German court. In the exceptional cases where an immediate
transfer is not possible or feasible, the obligee-spouse must wait
until *the old age or disability pension rights of the other spouse
mature. At that time he or she may claim an appropriate part of
each installment from the pension recipient when it is received (the
so-called schuldrechtlicher Versorgungsausgleich).67 In cases of ex-
ceptional hardship or inequity, the equalization of security benefits
can be omitted or temporarily suspended by the court.68
Viewed as a matter of policy, the equalization of benefits
(Versorgungsausgleich) is an extension of the principle of equaliza-
tion of marital property increase (Zugewinnausgleich) but there are
differences in the operation of the two processes. Zugewinnausgleich
takes place on divorce only where the couple has been living under
the basic stautory regime of matrimonial property (gesetzlicher
Gfiterstand), and not where a different marital property regime has
been chosen by matrimonial contract, or where the statutory regime
has been terminated by operation of law or judicial decree.
Versorgungsausgleich applies in all divorces, irrespective of whether
the parties have been living under the statutory marital property
regime, unless the equalization of benefits was excluded by mar-
riage contract, executed before a notary at the time of the marriage
or at a later time.6" Such an agreement is invalidated, however, if a
petition for divorce is filed within a year after the agreement was
executed.
While a divorce proceeding is pending, spouses are normally
given considerable freedom to make their own arrangements con-
cerning property equalization and post-divorce support, subject
only to the general requirements of legality and good morals (West
German Civil Code sections 134 and 138).70 Thus, alteration of the
Zugewinnausgleich is basically left to the parties and their lawyers.
On the other hand, the parties' freedom to modify or exclude the
Versorgungsausgleich during the pendency of a divorce proceeding
Id., §§ 1587f-1587n (inserted by 1. EheRG, supra note 1).
" Id., §§ 1587c-1587d (inserted by 1. EheRG, supra note 1), where the situations are
defined in great detail.
Id., § 1408 (incorporating amendments made by 1. EheRG, supra note 1).
70 Id., § 1363(1) (incorporating amendments made by the Equality Law of 1957, supra
note 8).
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is strictly limited. Versorgungsausgleich is generally to be initiated
by the court on its own motion, and is to be carried out in inquisi-
torial fashion. Any agreement suggested by the parties on the equal-
ization of benefits in connection with the divorce must not only be
executed before a notary, but must be submitted to the family court
judge for approval. 7' Approval may be withheld if the judge finds
that the agreement, viewed in conjunction with the support and
property arrangements made by the spouses, will not provide appro-
priate security against old age or incapacity for a spouse who
would otherwise be entitled to pension equalization, or that the
agreement does not effect an appropriate equalization between the
spouses.
The West German Versorgungsausgleich is an attempt to deal
with the novel problem of "new property" that has attracted rapidly
increasing attention in a number of places. It has, of course, been
tailored to the disability and retirement plans that exist in West
Germany. Though details differ from country to country, similar
plans apparently exist everywhere. The West German reform law
may furnish valuable suggestions for treatment of these plans upon
divorce. As its effective date was July 1, 1977, time will be needed
to see how it will work in practice. Fear has been expressed already
that both partners will often be left with insignificantly small
"dwarf pensions" under the statute. But the Versorgungsausgleich
is meant to be seen in a social setting where both partners to a
marriage, male and female, are active participants in the labor
force, at least before and after marriage, and where women engage
in at least some gainful employment during part of the marriage.
In such a setting the husband's insurance account would not be
affected too seriously, and the wife's account could be expected to
increase eventually through her own gainful activity.
B. Post-Divorce Spousal Support
Prior to the reform law, the right of a spouse to post-divorce
support depended in important respects on the judicial determina-
tion of "guilt." If a husband was found to be at fault, he was obliged
to maintain his wife-insofar as her own resources were insuffi-
cient-at the same economic level enjoyed during married life.72 If,
1, Id., § 1587o (inserted by 1. EheRG, supra note 1). For a discussion and comparison of
§ 1408(2), governing exclusion of the Versorgungsausgleich through marriage contract (note
69 supra,) and § 1587o governing its exclusion through agreement in connection with divorce,
see Rohde, Vertraglicher Ausschluss des Versorgungsausgleichs, 30 NJW 1763 (1977).
7 Eh~d, supra note 5, § 58.
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on the other hand, the wife was found to be at fault, she was obli-
gated to maintain her husband after divorce at a mere subsistence
level, and that was required only if he was incapable of supporting
himself.13
The 1976 reform replaced these rules with a fundamentally dif-
ferent system. Not only is marital fault made irrelevant to the set-
tlement of the spouses' economic affairs, but, as a general rule,
spousal support is not even to be available after divorce except as
needed to help an economically weaker spouse adjust to a new situa-
tion and become economically self-sufficient. As under the Ameri-
can Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,74 each spouse is expected
to be self-supporting, and the basic mechanism for adjusting the
spouses' financial affairs upon divorce is to be property division
rather than maintenance. As explained above, the new German
system of property division includes both the sharing of a superior
increase in one spouse's net worth during the marriage (the
Zugewinnausgleich)75 and a similar sharing of such "new property"
as pension and insurance rights (the Versorgungsausgleich).
The basic principle governing post-divorce support under the
new system is stated in section 1569: "If a spouse cannot take care
of his support after divorce by himself, he has a claim for support
against the other spouse according to the following provisions."
Thus, a claim for support (Unterhalt), as distinct from the sharing
of marital property increase and the equalization of future benefits,
may be made only if a spouse meets one of several enumerated
conditions. New Civil Code sections 1570 through 1576 specify the
six classes of spouses who may claim support.
The first category involves spouses caring for a child of the
marriage:
§ 1570. A divorced spouse can demand support from the
other so long and insofar as employability6 cannot be expected
of him on account of the care or upbringing of a common child.
Spouses who cannot be self-supporting because of age are also
given a claim:
7 Id.
" UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr, supra note 54, § 308.
75 The West German marital property system established in 1957 has not been changed
significantly by the 1976 reform law. For a description of the system, see Rheinstein &
Glendon, Marriage: Interspousal Relations, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, ch. 4 (A. Chloros ed., to be published in 1978).
", The German word is Erwerbstatigkeit-the capacity of a person to earn his own living
by self-employment or employment by another.
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§ 1571. A divorced spouse can demand support from the
other, insofar as at the time of
(1) the divorce,
(2) the termination of the care or upbringing of a com-
mon child, or
(3) the cessation of the conditions for a support claim
under §§ 1572 and 1573,
employability can no longer be expected of him on account of
his age.
The third category envisions a claim for support by a physically
or mentally incapacitated spouse:
§ 1572. A divorced spouse can demand support from the
other, so long and insofar as at the time of
(1) the divorce,
(2) the termination of the care or upbringing of a com-
mon child,
(3) the termination of training, continued education or
re-education, or
(4) the cessation of the conditions for a support claim
under § 1573,
employability cannot be expected of him on account of sick-
ness, or other impairment or weakness of his physical or mental
faculties.
The fourth category of claims relates to a spouse's unemploy-
ment, inability to find "appropriate" employment, or inability to
earn sufficient income:
§ 1573. (1) If a divorced spouse has no claim to support
under § § 1570 to 1572, he can nevertheless demand support so
long and insofar as he is unable to find any appropriate em-
ployment after the divorce.
(2) If the income from an appropriate employment is in-
sufficient for full support ( § 1578),7 he can claim the difference
7 The section referred to describes in a general way the measure of support.
§ 1578 (1) The measure of support is determined according to the marital standard
of living. Support includes all necessities of life.
(2) To the necessities of life belong the cost of appropriate insurance for illness as
well as the costs of educational or vocational training, or continued training, or retrain-
ing under §§ 1574-1575.
(3) If the divorced spouse has a support claim under §§ 1570-1573 or 1576, the
costs of appropriate insurance for old age as well as vocational or occupational incapacity
are included in the necessities of life.
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between his income and full support, if he does not already
have a support claim under § § 1570 to 1572.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) apply correspondingly, if sup-
port was granted under §§ 1570 to 1572, or 1575, but the pre-
conditions of these provisions have lapsed.
(4) A divorced spouse can also claim support, if the in-
come from an appropriate employment ceases, because he does
not succeed, despite his efforts, in assuring his support after
divorce in a lasting fashion through employment. If he succeeds
in assuring his partial support in a lasting fashion, he can claim
the difference between the support thus assured and full sup-
port.
The concept of "appropriate employment" is explained in the
following section:
§ 1574. (1) A divorced spouse need undertake only an em-
ployment which is appropriate for him.
(2) An appropriate employment is one which corresponds
to the education, ability, age and state of health of the divorced
spouse as well as to the circumstances in which the couple lived
while married; in connection with the aforementioned circum-
stances, the duration of the marriage and the duration of care
or upbringing of a common child are to be taken into considera-
tion.
(3) Insofar as it is necessary for his entrance into an ap-
propriate employment, it is the duty of the divorced spouse to
have himself trained, to obtain additional training or to be
retrained, if a more successful outcome of training is to be
expected.
The fifth category of cases in which post-divorce support may
be claimed reflects a concern that has begun to appear in American
cases as well. Section 1575 permits one spouse to obtain temporary
support from the other in order to finish an interrupted course of
studies or to secure more advanced training in a professional field,
particularly where the spouse's employment opportunities have
been impaired by what the West German law refers to as "marriage-
conditioned delays," such as the devotion of years to child care or
the interruption of studies upon marriage.
§ 1575. (1) A divorced spouse, who in anticipation of mar-
riage or during the marriage has not undertaken or has broken
off educational or vocational training, can seek support from
the other spouse, if he undertakes this or a corresponding train-
ing as soon as possible in order to obtain appropriate employ-
ment that assures enduring support, and if a successful out-
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come of such training is to be expected. The claim exists, at
the most, for the time generally needed for the conclusion of
such training; in connection therewith, marriage-conditioned
delays to training are to be taken into consideration.
(2) Correspondingly, this section applies if the divorced
spouse continues his education or is retrained in order to com-
pensate for disadvantages incurred because of the marriage.
(3) If the divorced spouse, after the termination of train-
ing, continued training or retraining, claims support under §
1573, his improved higher educational status remains outside
consideration in ascertaining what is an employment appropri-
ate for him (§ 1574 paragraph 2).
The sixth and last category of eligibility for post-divorce
spousal support is more general, leaving open the possibility of a
spouse's receiving support by showing that he or she cannot be
expected to be employed for "grave reasons" other than child care,
age, incapacity, unemployment, or because he or she is receiving
training under section 1575. Recognizing the potential this general
clause offers for reintroduction of the marital misconduct factor, the
legislature provides that "grave reasons" that may have led to the
breakdown of the marriage shall not be decisive in themselves. On
the other hand, such evidence is not totally excluded from the deci-
sion to grant a support claim:
§ 1576. A divorced spouse can claim support from the other,
insofar and so long as employment cannot be expected of him
for other grave reasons, and the denial of support, considering
the interests of both spouses, would be grossly unfair. Grave
reasons should not be taken into consideration solely because
they have led to the foundering of the marriage.
This section is expected to be applied, for example, in situa-
tions where a spouse, at a sacrifice to his or her own professional
development, has devoted years to working in the business of the
other spouse, or where a spouse has shown exceptional loyalty in
times of particular hardship.78
Even though a claimant meets the threshold requirements for
post-divorce support, he may be denied it on other grounds. A court
may refuse the claim of a spouse otherwise entitled to support who
has sufficient personal resources to be self-supporting or where an
11 Diederichsen, Ehegattenunterhalt im Anschluss an die Ehescheidung nach dem 1.
EheRG, 30 NJW 353, 357 (1977).
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allowance of support would be "grossly unfair" under all the circum-
stances of the case.'
The situations in which a spouse's personal resources disqualify
a claim for support are regulated by section 1577:
§ 1577. (1) The divorced spouse cannot claim support
under §§ 1570 to 1573, 1575 and 1576, so long and insofar as
he can support himself from his own income and property.
(2) Income is not to be taken into account insofar as the
obligor does not supply the full support (§ 1578).71 Income that
exceeds the full support is to be counted, insofar as this corre-
sponds to fairness in the light of the mutual economic circum-
stances.
(3) The basic capital of his property need not be cashed
in by the claimant insofar as the realization would be uneco-
nomic, or unfair, in view of the mutual economic circumstan-
ces.
(4) If it was to be expected at the time of the divorce that
the support of the claimant from his own property would be
lastingly assured, no claim for support lies if the property later
on turns out to be insufficient. This does not apply, if, at the
time of the insufficiency of the property, employment of the
spouse cannot be expected on account of the care or upbringing
of a common child.
The difficult question of what constitutes such unfairness that
support ought to be denied an otherwise eligible spouse is tackled
in section 1579. An effort was made to exclude ordinary marital
misconduct from consideration and the entire question of gross un-
fairness is made irrelevant where a spouse claims support on the
basis of his duties in connection with a child of the marriage.
§ 1579. (1) A support claim does not exist insofar as the
claim against the liable spouse would be grossly unfair, because
1. the marriage was of short duration; the duration of the
marriage includes the time during which the claimant was
entitled to support under § 1570 on account of the care or
upbringing of a common child,
2. the claimant has been guilty of a felony or a serious
intentional misdemeanor against the obligor spouse or a
near relative of the obligor spouse,
7' See note 77 supra.
1978]
The University of Chicago Law Review
3. the claimant has maliciously brought about his own
state of need, or
4. another ground exists, as grave as those set out in
numbers 1 to 3.
(2) Par. (1) does not apply so long and insofar as employ-
ment cannot be expected of the claimant on account of the care
or upbringing of a common child.
Paragraph (1) reflects a concern widely expressed in modern
divorce legislation that the termination of a relatively short mar-
riage should not furnish an occasion for far-reaching alteration of a
spouse's financial affairs. However, since marriage "duration"
under this paragraph is deemed to include the time in which a
divorced spouse has cared for a child of the marriage, a marriage of
only a few months' legal existence can have a "duration" of many
years. The general unfairness ground of paragraph (1)(4) was added
as a late compromise. Originally, the drafters of the government bill
had limited the cases of gross unfairness to the three enumerated
instances, fearing that a general clause would undermine the pur-
pose of the reform law to eliminate marital misconduct evidence
from divorce litigation.8 °
Where support is awarded, it is generally to be provided
through monthly payments, although in exceptional cases, it may
be awarded as a lump sum."1 The support claim binds the estate of
the obligor spouse, 2 but ceases with the remarriage or death of the
claimant spouse.
It has been questioned whether the principle of individual re-
sponsibility after divorce has been submerged by the six wide-
ranging exceptions just discussed. Commentators have suggested
that the principle of self-sufficiency will be implemented in fact
only in three groups of marriage dissolution cases: those involving
double-earner marriages, marriages of relatively short duration, and
marriages of young childless couples. 3 On the other hand, the pract-
ical importance of the broad categories in which support is theoreti-
cally available is bound to be somewhat diminished by the mandate
that the court consider the resources and the other obligations of the
0 Diederichsen, supra note 78, at 357.
81 BGB § 1585. This section also regulates the conditions under which security for sup-
port obligations may be required.
Id., §§ 1586-1586b. Under certain circumstances, the support obligation may revive
upon the divorce of a remarried claimant-spouse. Section 1586a.
3 Diederichsen, supra note 78, at 353.
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obligor spouse (including obligations to a new family) in fixing the
amount of support.84
Finally, the support provisions apply only if the parties have
not otherwise agreed.85 By contract, support can be given to a spouse
who is not legally eligible for it, or support can be renounced by an
eligible spouse. The level of support might also be fixed at a point
above or below that which the law would require in the absence of
private agreement. The draftsmen intended to facilitate such agree-
ments in order to avoid unnecessary conflict in the divorce proceed-
ing itself and to prevent post-divorce controversies over support. 6
In sum, West Germany provides three types of security for the
economically weaker party in a divorce: equalization of property
increase, equalization of future benefits, and claims for periodic
support. The latter remedy is given the subordinate role of supple-
menting the other two in situations of special need. When granted,
support is to be temporary only, save in exceptional cases. As far
as possible, post-divorce litigation and post-divorce obligations are
sought to be avoided. To what extent this aim will be achieved
cannot be predicted.
IV. COURT ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE
The desire for a unified disposition of all issues involved in the
dissolution of a marriage resulted in a far-reaching innovation in
West German judicial organization and procedure.' Under pre-
reform law, the dissolution of the marriage and the consequences of
dissolution were independently handled in separate proceedings.
The questions of whether a marriage could be dissolved and who, if
anyone, was the "guilty" party were decided by the Civil Chamber
of the Landgericht consisting of three judges. The law enumerated
the exclusive situations in which a marriage could be dissolved, and
required the court to find the facts independent of the parties' alle-
gations and admissions. The possibility of intervention by the
State's Attorney was to be additional protection against collusive
attempts to present untrue or incomplete facts in divorce cases and
in cases involving allegations of void or voidable marriage. Once the
11 BGB § 1581. As a rule, the support obligation to the divorced spouse takes precedence
over the obligation to a new spouse. See § 1581(1).
Id., § 1585c.
Diederichsen, supra note 78, at 362-63.
See 1. EheRG, supra note 1, arts. 5, 6 & 7, amending the Law on Judicial Organization
(Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz), the Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), and the Law on Non-
Litigious Jurisdiction (Gesetz Ciber die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit).
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marital proceeding (Ehesache) reached a judgment of dissolution,
remaining issues were to be handled in separate proceedings before
different courts with partially adversary and partially inquisitorial
procedures. The one-man Amtsgericht had jurisdiction as Guardi-
anship Court (Vormundschaftsgericht) in matters of child custody
and visitation rights, and as Court of Litigation (Streitgericht) in
matters of support. Property settlements were to be decided by the
Landgericht if the value of the assets involved was DM 3,000 (about
$1,500) or more, and by the Amtsgericht if the value was less, or,
independent of value, if the matter in controversy was the marital
dwelling or household equipment.
Such at least was the scheme on the books. In fact, the
Landgericht made no use of its investigatory powers and the State's
Attorney practically never intervened. Representation by an attor-
ney was necessary only before the Landgericht. In about ninety
percent of all divorce cases the defendant did not contest the plain-
tiff's prearranged allegations, did not appear in court, and did not
use the services of an attorney. The issues of support and property
settlement were often determined out of court and with only one
attorney, if any. In matters of custody and visitation rights, parties
sought representation by an attorney only in exceptional circum-
stances.
All this has been changed by the reform act. At the
Amtsgerichte, newly established Divisions of Family Matters
(Familiengerichte) have comprehensive jurisdiction in marital pro-
ceedings (Ehesachen), that is, matters of divorce, dissolution of
marriage because of defective formation or nullity, actions for decla-
ratory judgment of existence or non-existence of marriage, actions
to bring about the establishment of marital community of life, and
actions for separation. In matters of divorce, all issues of marriage
termination and its consequences are, as a general rule, to be de-
cided in a single proceeding yielding a single judgment.
In all phases of these "compound proceedings"
(Verfahrensverbund) the parties must be represented by attorneys.
Theoretically, it still suffices that the "petitioner" is represented by
counsel, but the court is to appoint an attorney to assist the other
party if that other party "asserts his rights insufficiently or not at
all" in matters concerning the divorce or the parental authority.
If the parties wish to obtain the divorce without contest, in
principle they must present to the court their detailed agreement on
all the consequences, 8 except the equalization of pension rights and
11 Diederichsen, Die Einfahrung der Familiengerichte durch das 1. EheRG, 30 NJW 601,
606 (1977).
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expectations which is to be regulated by the court upon its own
initiative and investigation even in a consent divorce.
In cases where the spouses are not in agreement, the rules of
procedure afford considerable possibility of delay to an opposing
spouse. As a rule, the court may not dissolve the marriage before it
has reached its decision concerning the effects of divorce.89 In this
decision, the court is required to rule on the parental authority over
any common children and to perform the equalization of property
and future pension rights." Issues relating to other effects of divorce
such as maintenance, visitation, division of household goods and so
on may be raised by either spouse in the petition or even during the
proceeding.9'
While the reform law has simplified divorce procedure in some
respects, marriages, as before, can be dissolved only by the decision
of a court. Not even the presumptions of section 1566 completely
eliminate the role of the judge, or permit "mail-order" divorce. Al-
though judicial inquest into the fact of breakdown is supposedly
eliminated where the section 1566 presumptions are used, the re-
vised rules of civil procedure applicable to divorce cases prescribe
that, in principle, the spouses are to be personally heard before the
judge in every divorce case.92
CONCLUSION
When the new provisions on the grounds of divorce are placed
in the context of the accompanying procedural rules and the new
legal provisions regulating the economic effects of divorce, it ap-
pears that the principal future impediment to divorce in West Ger-
many may be the complex and rigorous regulations governing sup-
port and equalization of property and pension benefits.9 3 The proce-
" ZPO § 629 as amended by 1. EheRG, supra note 1, art. 6.
" Id., § 623 as amended by 1. EheRG, supra note 1, art. 6.
11 Id., §§ 621 & 623 as amended by 1. EheRG, supra note 1, art. 6.
12 Id. § 613 as amended by 1. EheRG, supra note 1, art. 6.
13 At a meeting of German family court judges on December 5, 1977, participants esti-
mated that no more than 5000 divorces would have been granted under the new law during
its first six months of operation (from July 1 to December 31, 1977). This contrasts with more
than 50,000 divorces granted during the same period the preceding year. Petitions for divorce
were down fifty percent from the same period the preceding year. The drop in divorces
granted was explained in part by the initial difficulties in putting the new system into
operation. The drop in petitions appears to be due to a variety of factors. A disproportionately
high number of marriages were dissolved in the first half of 1977, many for the apparent
purpose of avoiding the uncertainties about the new law, in particular, about how the complex
provisions of the Versorgungsausgleich would be interpreted and applied in practice. The
same uncertainty, shared by lawyers and the population at large, is said to continue to hold
down, temporarily at least, the number of divorce petitions. Another factor is that the cost
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dural innovations of the reform law are likely to increase the cost of
divorce and to delay the time when divorcing parties obtain the
freedom to remarry. Under the pre-reform law, the cost of a divorce
was about DM 3000 ($1500). Under the new system it is expected
to be DM 5000 to 10,000 ($2500-5000). The establishment of the
waiting periods of one, three, or five years of separate living is ex-
pected to invite uncontested false allegations that such periods have
elapsed. While the reform law seems to facilitate the dissolution of
marriage by the general introduction of no-fault divorce, it may
merely result in a change in the form of time-honored subterfuges
or a further increase in the substitution of free unions for formal
legal marriage. The aspiration of the innovative economic provisions
of the reform law to minimize financial hardship upon divorce, like
the hope expressed in the first section of the act that marriage will
last a lifetime, represents an ideal that will prove difficult to realize
for persons of modest means in a world of ever-increasing divorce
and remarriage. The West German Marriage and Family Law Re-
form, like the recent French, English, and American efforts in the
area, invites reflection on the limits of law.
of divorce under the new law is up fifty percent over the old. The cheapest divorce is esti-
mated to cost about 5000 DM ($2500), and the expense climbs rapidly if a
Versorgungsausgleich is involved. Schwerer Start far neues Eherecht, Handelsblatt, Decem-
ber 6, 1977, at 1.
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